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1. The objective of the paper 
Milsark' s generalization is well known. 
Milsark's generalization "Properties may only be predicated of 'strong' NPs . "  
(Milsark 1 977 : 1 6) .  
In this paper, I shall restrict myself mostly to the discussion of bare NPs. I shall 
reformulate Milsark's generalization with this restriction and in terms of the 
individual-level (IL) and stage-level (SL) distinction introduced by Carlson ( 1 977). 
But I expect that the main claims to be made below can be extended to indefinite 
NPs in general. !  
Milsark's generalization (restricted to bare NPs and rephrased in terms of IL) 
" IL predicates may only be predicated of generic NPs. "  
Counterpart. "SL predicates may be predicated of existential NPs. " 
Milsark's generalization has generally been assumed to be related to the distinction 
between categorical and thetic judgments. The following generalization in the theory 
of judgments must be responsible for this perception: 
The definiteness effect on categorical judgments2 
(a) The subject of a CATEGORICAL JUDGMENT must be a "semantically definite" 
(including "generic") noun phrase. 
(b) The subject of a CATEGORICAL JUDGMENT may not be an indefinite 
"existential/cardinal" noun phrase. 
The main objective of this paper is to challenge the validity of Milsark' s  
generalization. According to the currently prevailing view, sentences with bare NP 
subjects represent different types of propositions depending on whether they are SL 
or IL; they are mapped onto different types of semantic representations .  In the 
former, subject NPs are existentially quantified and in the latter they are bound by 
the generic operator. I will present evidence against this view and argue that the 
distinction between SL and IL cuts across the distinction between generic and 
existential construals of bare NP subjects . I will maintain that sentences with bare 
NP subjects , whether SL or IL, are subject to generic/universal or non­
generic/existential construals depending on the domain of interpretation. 
2. Preliminaries 
It is well known that there are two sentence types in Japanese that correspond to 
English declarative sentences: I call one the PLAIN SENTENCE and the other the wa­
MARKED SENTENCE. Examples of plain sentences are given in ( 1 )-(2) and examples of 
wa-marked ones are given in (3) - (5).  The wa-marked noun phrase is commonly 
called a topic. I will follow this terminology, but I do not believe that the particle wa 
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of the wa-marked sentence can be accounted for as a topic marker in the sense 
understood in discourse theory or information packaging. But I am not going to be 
concerned with that issue in this paper. See Kuroda ( 1 992: 1 5f, 70ft) and Kuroda 
(200 1) .  
( 1 )  gengogaku no gakusei ga kinben de aru 
linguistics GEN student NOM hard-working be 
'linguistics students are hard-working' 
(2) inu ga neko 0 oikakete iru 
dog NOM cat ACC chase be 
'dogs are chasing cats' 
(3) gengogaku no gakusei wa kinben de aru 
linguistics GEN student TOP hard-working is 
'linguistics students are hard-working' 
(4) inu wa neko 0 oikakete iru 
dog cat ACC chase is 
'dogs are chasing cats' 
(5) neko wa inu ga oikakete iru 
cat dog NOM chase is 
'cats, dogs are chasing' 
In principle, any argument as well as any adjunct can be made a wa topic. The 
syntactic subject is made a topic in (3)-(4), and the direct object in (5) .  For the sake 
of this paper I assume the syntactic derivation of wa-marked sentences from plain 
sentences by movement as given in (6). (3)-(5) are derived by this movement as 
suggested in (7)-(9). 
(6) [cp . . . · [vp . . .  DPj . . . . .  ] . . ] -- > [cpDPj-wa . .  [vp . . . .  tj . . . .  ] . . ] 
(7) [gengogaku no gakusei wa [ t  kinben de aru]] 
(8) [inu wa [ t  neko 0 oikakete iro]] 
(9) [neko wa [inu ga t oikakete iro]] 
Semantically , the wa-marked sentence cannot be truth-conditionally 
distinguished from the plain sentence from which it is derived. To account for the 
functional difference between wa-marked and plain sentences, I have introduced and 
distinguished two semantic/cognitive objects, PROPOsmONS and JUDGMENTS . I follow 
the common assumption that sentences/clauses represent PROPOsmONS . In addition, I 
assume that sentences also express JUDGMENTS in syntactic contexts where they 
make assertions. 
I assume that wa-marked and plain sentences express different types of 
judgments. A wa-marked sentence expresses a categorical judgment, that is, a 
judgment in the form of a predication. A plain sentence expresses a judgment of the 
nonpredicational form, a DESCRIPTION of an abstract or concrete situation; the THETIC 
JUDGMENT is by definition a SUbtype of description, a description of an event. In 
some embedded contexts, for example in conditional clauses, sentences/clauses do 
not make assertions ; in such contexts only plain sentences can occur, and they are 
assumed to represent propositions but not to express any judgments . For this 
presentation, I have to assume that these distinctions are well known.3 
In what follows, however, most of the time we can assume the common 
semantic understanding according to which sentences are representations of 
propositions. The distinction between propositions and judgments matters only 
when I explicitly make reference to the concept of judgment. To sum up: 
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Plain sentences may express descriptive/thetic judgments and represent 
propositions 
or simply represent propositions. 
Wa -marked sentences express categorical judgments and represent 
propositions . 
3. The interpretation of bare NP subjects of SL sentences 
3.1. Let us consider the following SL sentence: 
( 1 2)a ringo ga kago no naka ni kireini narabete atta 
apple NOM basket GEN in at beautifully arrange was 
b 'apples were beautifully arranged in a basket' 
The standard translation of ( 12) into formal logic is an existential proposition given 
in ( 1 3) :  
( 1 3) 3x[APPLE(X)&ARRANGED-IN-A-BASKEf(X)] 
However, I would like to maintain that there are contexts in which ( 1 2) must be 
understood as if it represents a universally quantified proposition. Consider the 
following inference: 
( 1 4) (ano paathii de) ringo ga kago no naka ni kireini narabete atta; dakara 
(that party at) apples NOM basket GEN in at beautifully arrange was; therefore 
daremo ringo 0 tabe nakatta 
nobody apple ACC eat neg-past 
'(at that party) apples were beautifully arranged in a basket; therefore nobody 
ate apples' 
Here, two sentences are connected by means of dakara 'therefore' ; this conjoined 
sentence can give an impression that a natural inference was made. The background 
of the reasoning is the common-sense understanding that decent people refrain from 
disturbing what they perceive as a decorative arrangement. But there must be another 
"logical" basis underlying this natural reasoning: that the apples arranged in a basket 
are all the apples that there were. ( 1 3),  though true, is not sufficient to describe the 
logical function of ( 1 2) in ( 14) .  
This point can be substantiated by observing the following subtle and 
interesting contrast. Let us first translate the existential formula ( 1 3) ,  the standard 
logical rendition of ( 1 2) ,  back into Japanese, literally by using the verb of existence 
atta 'was/were' . We get: 
( 1 5)a kago no naka ni kireini narabete am ringo ga atta 
basket GEN in at beautifully arrange be apple NOM was 
b 'apples that were beautifully arranged in a basket were/existed' 
If we replace the first sentence (the premise) of the inference in ( 14) by ( 1 5), we get: 
( 1 6) (ano party de) kago no naka ni kirei ni narabete am ringo ga atta; dakara 
daremo ringo 0 tabenakatta 
'(at the party) apples that were beautifully arranged in a basket were/existed; 
therefore nobody ate apples' 
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The inferences ( 1 4) and ( 1 6) should be logically equivalent; we have simply 
replaced one premise with another, which are supposedly logically equivalent. 
However, there is a subtle, but remarkable difference between ( 1 4) and ( 1 6) .  The 
same difference can be observed in English between ( 1 7)a and ( 17)b: 
( 1 7)a Apples were arranged beautifully in a basket; so, nobody ate apples .  
b There were apples arranged beautifully in a basket; so nobody ate apples .  
( 1 6) ,  and I believe ( 17)b as well , lack the degree of naturalness of inference we 
observe in ( 1 4) as well as ( 1 7)a. It  is  difficult, or impossible, to understand ringo 
'apples' in ( 1 6) and ( 1 7)b as universally quantified. It is harder in ( 1 6) and ( 17)b 
than in ( 14) and ( 1 7)a to infer from the context that there were no apples other than 
those in the basket. Let us put aside for the moment why we get this difference, but 
the observed difference strengthens our initial intuition about ( 14) ; that is, ringo in 
( 14) can be understood as universally quantified. 
But it is definitely not the case that the subject ringo in ( 1 2) must be 
interpreted as universally quantified in all contexts . It is possible to witness an 
"inference" that contradicts such an interpretation. 
( 1 8) (ano paathii de) ringo ga kago no naka ni kireini narabete atta; daremo 
(that party at) apples NOM basket GEN in at beautifully arrange was; nobody 
kago no naka no ringo 0 tabe nakatta 
basket GEN in at apple ACC eat neg-past 
'(at the party) apples were beautifully arranged in a basket; nobody ate 
apples arranged in the basket. '  
By saying "nobody ate apples arranged in the basket" rather than "nobody ate 
apples , " the speaker would naturally be taken as implying that people might have 
eaten apples but those were apples that were not arranged in the basket. To 
summarize, some uses of ( 1 2) require universal interpretation of ringo 'apples' but 
other uses contradict such an interpretation. Nonetheless, I would like to maintain 
that we have one and the same proposition represented by ( 1 2) ,  and the difference in 
question is the matter of domains chosen for the interpretation of the proposition. 
3.2. As a general description of the semantics of an SL sentence S with a bare NP 
subject like ( 1 2), I propose the following formula: 
( 1 9) S = NPI . . .  Pred . . .  e . . .  , 
where e is an event argument and NPl, the subject of the predicate. 
Interpretation: 
INP l ls ,w = INPl ln le l where I I indicates the "universal " valuation 
and I Is,w, the interpretation relative to S and a modeVdomain w with 
respect to which the situation in question is described. le i denotes 
the set of entities involved in e. 
Let us agree that ( 1 9) presupposes that w contains e; only in such a domain is S 
interpretable. A domain w is called a g-DOMAIN for the proposition p represented by 
an SL sentence S (or, simply, for S) if INPl ls,w = INPl l nlwl . Thus, a domain w is a 
g-domain for p, if and only if those "NP l 's " that participate in e are exactly those 
that exist in w. Note that whether a domain is a g-domain for p or not depends on 
the interpretation of the event argument e. If a domain is not a g-domain, we call it a 
NON-g-OOMAIN.4 
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Let us consider sentence ( 12) in the context of the natural inference ( 14), and 
examine how it is understood. The hearer understands that an inference based on 
universal quantification is intended with respect to the subject, ringo 'apples'. Hence, 
the proposition p represented by ( 1 2) must be interpreted with respect to a g­
domain . The domain may be the entire building where the party was held, or as 
small as the corner of the room where the speaker and hearer were located at the 
time of the utterance; in any event the domain is sufficiently small not to contain any 
apples other than those arranged in the basket in question. In contrast, ( 1 2) ,  given in 
the context of discourse ( 1 8),  must be understood as interpreted with respect to a 
non-g-domain of ( 1 2) .  
The current common assumption is that the semantic representation (the 
logical form) of an SL sentence with a bare NP subject is an existentially quantified 
form like ( 1 3) .  This assumption does not account for the understanding of ( 1 2) in 
( 14) .  In order to account for this new situation, the common practice of formal 
semantics would require that sentence ( 1 2) be assigned another logical 
representation, i. e . ,  a universally quantified form. One and the same sentence ( 1 2) 
would thus be assigned two logical forms ; the sentence would be considered as 
semantically ambiguous . Instead of taking such a step, I propose that one and the 
same semantic interpretation corresponds to ( 1 2) ,  as indicated by ( 1 9) .  Then, the 
difference in the logical function of ( 1 2) observed in ( 14) and ( 1 8) is a matter of 
different pragmatic choices of domains with respect to which the sentence is 
construed. If the domain is a g-domain, ( 1 2) can be an input to a universal type of 
inference. If not, it cannot be, and it is subject to the usual existential construal given 
by ( 1 3) .  
Semantic representations and model-theoretic interpretations are matters of 
grammar, but the choice of the domain w with respect to which an interpretation is 
executed is a matter of the creative aspect of language use. Not only do choices 
constantly change during language use, but also they are ambiguous,  not well 
demarcated and hard to digitize. Logical laws are valid only if w is kept constant 
through a discourse. This constraint is, practically, hard to follow. In particular, g­
domains for an event are generally very small, and it is difficult/rare for a discourse 
to proceed with such a small discourse domain being kept constant. Empirical 
evidence for g-domains may be hard to come by. 
Whether w is a g-domain or not, if ( 1 2) is truthfully asserted, ( 1 3) holds, 
and vice versa. Thus, in this sense, ( 1 3) gives an adequate truth condition for ( 1 2) .  
But i f  w is a g-domain, ( 1 3) is an understatement and fails to monitor possible 
arguments done with ( 1 2) in natural language. Insomuch as the L O G I C A L  
representation of  a proposition represented by a sentence is assumed to  model 
reasoning in natural language performance, we have to assume either that ( 1 2) is 
semantically ambiguous, representing two different propositions, or that we cannot 
assign a unique logical representation to THE proposition represented by ( 1 2) .  I am 
arguing for the second alternative and against taking ( 1 3) as T H E  semantic 
representation of ( 1 2) .  Put in general terms, my argument is that the logical 
representation of an SL sentence is a matter of pragmatics and does not belong to 
the level of semantic representation. 
3.3. To recall, the contrast between the two inference forms, a natural one ( 14) and 
an inadequate one, ( 16), was crucial for our judgment that a bare NP subject may be 
construed as universally quantified. In order to account for this contrast, let us 
assume that the default choice for the domain of interpretation of an SL sentence 
with a bare NP subject is a g-domain. 
This is a pragmatic default case assumption. Unless the pragmatic situation 
contradicts it, one interprets an SL sentence S by choosing a sufficiently small 
domain, so that it satisfies the condition for a g-domain. We might try to 
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accommodate our utterance to meet this condition. Imagine, for example, that you 
are standing at a comer of a kitchen-dining area and see apples arranged in a basket 
on a table but we also see apples put on plates on the kitchen counter with other 
fruits . In this context, according to this assumption, (2 1 )  would be preferred to (20) : 
(20) apples are arranged beautifully in a basket 
(2 1 )  on the table, apples are arranged beautifully in a basket 
The locative explicitly suggests that the intended domain of interpretation is limited 
to a neighborhood of the table, excluding the counter area, a g-domain.5 
According to our assumption, the unmarked choice for the domain of 
interpretation for ( 1 2) ,  the premise in ( 14), is a g-domain w of ( 1 2) :  There are no 
apples in w other than those arranged in a basket as described by ( 1 2) .  Given this 
understanding, ( 14) is a natural inference. Now, consider ( 1 5) .  The subject of ( 1 5) is 
kago no naka ni kirei ni narabete aru ringo, 'apples arranged beautifully in a 
basket', not ringo 'apples' . What is a g-domain of ( I S)? A domain W is a g-domain 
for ( 1 5) if and only if W does not contain any apples arranged beautifully in a 
basket other than those arranged in the basket referred to in ( 1 5) ;  W may contain 
other apples not arranged in a basket. Hence, with ( 1 5) as a premise, a universal 
inference about apples arranged in a basket could be justified but not one about 
apples. As a consequence, ( 1 6) does not sound like a natural inference, as ( 1 4) does. 
( 1 2) and ( 1 5) stand in a relation worthy of particular note. They are truth­
conditionally equivalent. Interpreted with respect to the same situation/event e and 
with the same domain D, they are either true or false together. Nonetheless, they are 
not logically equi-functional . A proper inference with ( 1 2) as a premise ceases to 
SOUND proper if the premise is replaced by the truth-conditionally equivalent ( 1 5) .  
For, with ( 1 5), we are expected to interpret the inference with respect to a g-domain 
of ( 1 5) .  But, in fact, for ( 1 5) ,  any domain is necessarily a g-domain, due to the 
special property of the predicate exist: no domain can contain apples that are 
beautifully arranged in a basket that do not exist. It follows that ( 1 5) is unprejudiced 
as to whether there are apples other than those that are arranged in a basket, and ( 1 6) 
cannot make a natural inference in any circumstances. We have thus accounted for 
the functional difference between the truth-conditionally equivalent ( 1 2) and ( 1 5).6 
3.4. The following assertions follow directly from ( 19) :  
Assertion 1 .  (Downward invariance of the g-domain) A subdomain of a g­
domain for an SL proposition p with a bare NP subject is a g-domain for p .7  
Assertion 2.  (Upward invariance of the non-g-domain) A domain that contains 
a non-g-domain for an SL proposition p with a bare NP subject is a non-g-domain 
for p. 
Now I claim the following main assertion of this section to hold: 
Assertion 3. An SL sentence S represents one and the same PROPOsmON through 
upward extension and downward restriction of domains. 
Thus, with this assertion I contend that an SL sentence with a bare noun phrase 
subject has a unique semantic representation, even though the logical function of its 
subject is not invariant with changes of domains. One could take this assertion either 
as a proposal for a way to use the term "proposition" (a definition) or as a claim as 
to how to understand what "proposition" is (a hypothesis) .  The reason that I put it 
as an assertion (thus a hypothesis and an empirical claim) is that I assume we as 
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theoreticians have some intuitive feel about "something" that we would wish to call a 
proposition and Assertion 3 is about this something. It claims that if the subject of 
an SL sentence is a bare noun phrase, its apparent function changes between g­
domains and non-g-domains, but the sentence represents one and the same 
"proposition" ;  it is not SEMANTICALLY AMBIGUOUS. The speaker and hearer are to be 
warned that for a proper application of logic, they must keep track of the changes of 
domains of interpretation properly during a discourse, rather than of the changes of 
propositions represented by one and the same sentence. 
So far the Japanese sentences we have dealt with are all plain sentences. Let 
us at this point consider wa-marked sentences. Consider (22) : 
(22) ringo wa kagQ no naka ni kireini narabete atta. 
apple top basket gen in at beautifully arrange were 
'apples were beautifully arranged in a basket' 
Let us substitute (22) for ( 1 2) in ( 14) : 
(23)a (ano paathii de) ringo wa kago no naka ni kirei ni narabete atta; dakara 
daremo ringo 0 tabenakatta 
b '(at that party) [the] apples were arranged beautifully in a basket; so, nobody 
ate apples' 
I translated ringo wa as ' [the] apples' ,  with the definite article, but as there is no 
syntactic distinction between definite and indefinite in Japanese, it is a moot point to 
assume that the wa phrase in (23) here must be categorially taken as definite . 8 
What interests us, and what is not moot, is that the wa-marking carries the 
implication that the apples in the basket were all the apples there were. Thus, (23) 
sounds as natural as, indeed perhaps more natural than, ( 14) as a deduction based on 
the common-sense presupposition that decent people do not disturb a decorative 
arrangement. 
Compare ( 1 8) with (24) below. I replaced ga in ( 1 8) by wa. 
(24) (ano paathii de) ringo wa kago no naka ni kirei ni narabete atta; daremo kago 
no naka no ringo 0 tabe nakatta 
'(at that party) (the) apples were beautifully arranged in a basket; nobody ate 
apples in the basket. '  
( 1 8) invites the inference that there were other apples than those that were arranged 
in the basket. In contrast, (24) does not naturally invite such an inference. Rather, the 
wa after the first ringo suggests that the apples in the basket were all the apples that 
there were. With this understanding, the inference would go through, though one 
might at least sense stylistic awkwardness: the direct object of the second sentence 
sounds redundantly modified by kago no naka no 'in the basket' . 
These observations show that the wa-marked sentence (22) must be 
interpreted in a g-domain. I take (23) -(24) as evidence for the following assertion. 
Assertion 4. A wa-marked SL sentence with a bare noun phrase subject is 
interpreted in a g-domain of the proposition represented by its plain sentence 
source. 
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4. The interpretation of bare NP subjects of IL sentences 
We now move to IL sentences. Consider the following discourse (25) :  
(25)a France-go wa iroirona kuni no hito ga  hanasite iru 
France-language various country GEN person NOM speak are 
'persons of various countries speak French' 
b (Motiron,) France-zin ga France-go 0 hanasu 
of course France-people NOM France-language ACC speak 
'(Of course) The French speak French' 
c (sorekara) Morocco-zin ga France-go 0 hanasu 
and Morocco-people NOM France-language ACC speak 
'(and) 'Moroccans speak French' 
d Canada-zin ga France-go 0 hanasu. 
Canada -people NOM France-language ACC speak 
'Canadians speak French' 
The intended meaning of (25)d is not "generic/universal, " but only "existential . " 
The possibility of this non-generic/non-universal construal of a plain IL sentence 
contrasts sharply with the impossibility of such a construal for a wa-marked IL 
sentence. (28)  is approximated only by (29) ;  it's construal cannot be "non­
generic/non-universal" as (26) can. Thus, the plain sentence (26) can be used as an 
"existential" statement about Canadians in this real world, as in discourse (25),  while 
(28) in contrast cannot be truthfully uttered about Canadians in general, given the 
way the real world is .  (28) can of course be truthfully uttered, but only in special 
circumstances where all Canadians present happen generally to be French-speaking. 
(26) 
(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
Canada-zin ga France-go 0 hanasu 
Some Canadians speak French 
Canada-zin wa France-go 0 hanasu 
All Canadians speak French 
[=(25d)] 
[contrual of (26) in (25)] 
Keep in mind that the contrast between the wa-marked and the plain sentences is not 
between generic/universal and non-generic/non-universal interpretations; the plain 
sentence form, like (25)b-d, does not exclude the possibility of a generic/universal 
interpretation . Rather, the syntactic and pragmatic context determines the 
interpretation. Take, for example, the plain sentence form (25)b. Even in the context 
of discourse (25), this sentence can be taken as intended to be a generic/universal 
statement; it could in fact be continued as follows:  
(30) France-zin ga France-go 0 hanasu; zissai, France-zin wa 
France -people NOM France-language ACC speak; in fact, France-people -
France-go sika hanasanai 
France-language except speak-neg 
'The French speak French; in fact, the French speak only French. '  
Lest one should wonder if the predicate hanasu 'speak' in generic interpretation 
might be taken as a type transfer from an SL predicate 'be speaking' and suggest that 
what we have observed about this IL predicate is due to this type transfer, let me give 
examples with predicative nominals, intrinsically IP predicates: 
(3 1 )  (yo-no-naka mo kawatta mono da) 
(world also changed thing is) 
'(the fact is that the world has indeed changed)' 
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Nihon-zin ga major league no sensyu de Mooko-zin ga sumoo tori da 
Japanese NOM GEN player and Mongolian NOM sumo wrestler is 
'Japanese are major league players and Mongolians are sumo wrestlers' 
(32) (yo no naka mo kawatta mono da) 
major no sensyu ga nihon-zin de sumoo tori ga mooko-zin da 
'(the fact is that the world has indeed changed) 
major league players are Japanese and sumo wrestlers are Mongolians' 
The intended interpretation of (3 1 )  is not of course that all, or even many, major 
league players are Japanese, nor that all, or even most sumo wrestlers are 
Mongolian. 
To recapitulate, whether we have a generic/universal construal or non­
generic/non-universal construal of a bare NP subject depends on context, that is, on 
domains of intended interpretation. Thus, what we have with IL sentences is a 
situation much like we have had above with SL sentences.9 
Given these observations, I maintain that as in the case with SL sentences, 
whether a generic/universal or "non-generic/existential" interpretation is intended for 
the bare NP subject of an IL sentence is a matter of domains with respect to which 
the sentence is evaluated, and not the matter of whether the semantic representation 
of the sentence has a categorially distinct generic or existential NP as the subject. 
This point is obscured as long as our attention is turned only to generic sentences of 
the type which allow usual generic interpretation due to the way the real world 
actually is ,  such as (25)b above. (25)b can be interpreted as generic/universal 
whatever the domain of interpretation happens to be. Examples like (26) and (3 1 )  
are crucial. 
We might say that an IL sentence with a bare NP is construed as 
generic/universal if the intended domain of interpretation is a g-domain, and as non­
generic/non-universal (existential) if not. However, we cannot define g- and non-g­
domains for IL sentences similarly to way we did for SL sentences . For one thing, it 
is not obvious that the introduction of an analogue of ( 1 9) for IL sentences, with a 
" state of affairs" argument in place of an event argument, is a viable solution. 
Furthermore, as is well known, a generic reading is in many ways different from a 
universal reading and defies any simplistic account in terms of set-theoretically 
defined extensions.  Nor is it clear exactly how the non-generic/non-universal 
construal of a bare NP subject of an IL sentence should be understood. It is 
certainly an existential construal of some sort, but there is something generic about 
it, too ; it might be called an existential generic. Mere existence does not suffice to 
license existential generics . For example, even though there are French speaking 
Americans, it would not be proper to say "Americans speak French" in the context 
of (25). I shall not attempt to interpret/define g-domains for IL sentences set/model 
theoretically . Instead, I adopt an axiomatic approach; by reversing the direction of 
conceptualization, I propose to understand g-domains for IL sentences as those that 
license generic/universal construals and non-g-domains as those that do not. 
I maintain, then, on the strength of Assertions 1 -4, which followed from ( 19),  
that the following analogues of Assertions 1 -4 hold as axioms: 
Analogue of Assertion 1 .  (Downward invariance of the g-domain) A 
subdomain of a g-domain for an IL proposition p with a bare NP subject is a g­
domain for p. lO  
Analogue of Assertion 2. (Upward invariance of the non-g-domain) A 
domain that contains a non-g-domain for an IL proposition p with a bare NP subject 
is a non-g-domain for p. 
Analogue of Assertion 3. An IL sentence S represents one and the same 
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PRoposmON through upward extension and downward restriction of domains .  
Analogue of Assertion 4. A wa-marked IL sentence with a bare noun phrase 
subject is interpreted in a g-domain of the proposition represented by its source 
plain sentence. 
These are plausible assertions, but since we lack grounding of the basic concepts on 
the standard set/model theoretic framework, they must be taken, and ultimately 
justified, as hypotheses for an empirical theory about g- and non-g-domains, or, 
equivalently, about generic/universal and non-generic/existential construal. 
s. The synthesis 
In the preceding two sections I have presented evidence for the claim that sentences 
with bare NP subjects, whether SL or IL, are subject to generic/universal or non­
generic/non-universal, existential construals depending on whether the domain of 
interpretation is a g-domain or not. I further maintain that parallel sets of assertions 
hold about these construals and domains for SL and IL sentences . A standard 
response to the situation we face might be to assume that both SL and IL sentences 
are semantically ambiguous,  mapped onto two distinct semantic representations.  
Formally, such a standard semantic approach would adequately describe the 
observed distinctions. However, I would propose a different, pragmatic approach. I 
am not at present in a position to offer empirical evidence to choose one or the other 
approach on formal grounds. My argument is a plausibility argument speculating on 
performance. 
Thus, as stated in Assertion 3 and its analogue above, I propose that a 
sentence with a bare NP subject represents one and the same proposition, but that its 
construal depends on where it is to be interpreted. I would attribute to the speaker 
and hearer more secure knowledge about sentences and propositions than merely 
how to interpret them, which depends on the choice of the domain for interpretation. 
Misunderstanding, if it takes place, is then due not to the failure of understanding 
one and the same sentence or one and the same proposition (meaning) represented 
by a sentence by the speaker and hearer, but to the failure to agree on the pragmatic 
choice of one and the same domain for the interpretation of the communicated 
proposition. 
In view of the parallelism we observed above between SL and IL sentences 
with bare noun phrase subjects, I conclude: 
Thesis 1. Sentences with bare NP subjects represent the same type of propositions, 
regardless of whether they are SL or IL. 
Let us call bare NP subjects as well as sentences with bare NP subjects 
GENERIC/EXISTENTIAL. Generic/existential sentences satisfy the same set of axioms 
formulated in Assertions 1 -4 and their Analogues whether they are SL or IL. 
There is nonetheless a difference between the SL and the IL cases . For SL 
sentences, we can adequately account for both generic/universal and non­
generic/existential interpretation and for g- and non-g-domains in terms of the 
standard set/model theoretic approach to semantics. For IL sentences, we do not 
have a satisfactory account, either for generic/universal or for non-generic/existential 
interpretation; nor can we ground the concept of g-domain on a set-theoretic basis .  
This means that we cannot present a unified extensionalist account for the attempted 
generalization over the SL and IL distinction formulated in Thesis 1 .  
B e  that as it may, I still have to formulate a generalization for the unified 
understanding of generic/universal and non-generic/existential interpretations for SL 
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and IL sentences . Let us leave aside negative sentences,  as we have in effect been 
doing in this presentation, since negation involves its own complications. Then, the 
valid generalization is :  a sentence with a bare NP subject can be construed as 
representing a universal affirmative proposition in the sense of classical syllogism 
(that is, the A form in the traditional notation) when intended to be interpreted in a g­
domain, and a particular affirmative (that is, the E form) when intended to be 
interpreted in a non-g domain. A generic/existential proposition can be an input to 
an A-type inference if interpreted in a g-domain, and to an E-type inference when 
interpreted in a non-g-domain. Let me conclude: 
Assertion 5. A generic/existential (affirmative) sentence is interpreted as the A form 
(universal) and the E form (particular) of a syllogism in a g-domain and non-g­
domain, respectively, and respective syllogistic inference rules may apply. 
Let us note that whatever the right L O G I C A L  representations of 
generic/universal and non-generic/existential interpretations might be for IL 
sentences, they cannot in general be taken as their semantic representations ; the 
same point has been claimed for the logical representations of SL sentences in the 
form of existentially and universally quantified formulas of predicate calculus in 
section 3.2 above. Assertion 5 must be understood as entailing the following general 
claim: 
Thesis 2. Logical representations of sentences are not semantic representations;  
they are pragmatically determined relative to domains of interpretation. 
6. Milsark's generalization(s) 
With the preceding preparations, we now proceed to discuss Milsark' s  
generalization. I repeat it here in two forms, as before: 
Milsark's generalization: Properties may only be predicated of " strong"  NPs . 
(Milsark 1977 : 1 6) .  
Milsark's generalization (restricted to bare NPs and rephrased in  terms of IL) 
IL predicates may only be predicated of generic NPs. 
Let us remind ourselves that Milsark's original definition of the " strong/weak" 
distinction is syntactic in character, in fact, dependent on English syntax: NPs are 
weak if they are permitted in post-copular position in there-insertion existential 
sentences ;  otherwise, they are strong (Milsark 1977 : 8) .  The distinction, however, 
has been extended to other languages in later literature, on semantic grounds . For 
our present consideration of bare NPs, the distinction amounts to that between 
generic and existential . In any case, the original Milsark generalization concerns 
selectional restrictions that hold between predicate types and NP types . As far as 
bare NPs are concerned, I have maintained that the categorial selection between 
generic and existential is illusory, and hence so is that subpart of Milsark's 
generalization that relates to this distinction. I put this conclusion in the following 
thesis. 
Thesis 3. Milsark's generalization (restricted form) is an epiphenomenon. 
The argument for this thesis prima facie cannot be directly extended to cardinality 
NPs such as two apples, many apples etc . We need to clarify what we want to 
understand by "generic/universal cardinals . "  Be that as it may, I believe that Thesis 
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3 can be generalized to the original form of Milsark's generalization in a full form, 
but in this paper, I put cardinality NPs aside and leave the matter only as a 
conjecture. 1 1 
There is, however, a distinct difference between SL and IL sentences : SL 
sentences allow referential construal of their indefinite subject but not IL sentences. 
Thesis 4. (The residue of Milsark's generalization) Indefinite NPs can be 
'referential ' in SL sentences but not in IL sentences. 
Observe the contrast between (33) and (34) and between (35) and (36) : 
(33) Look there, (many) apples are arranged beautifully in a basket ! 
(34) *Look there, (many) apples are beautiful ! 
(35) Look there, (many) Canadians are speaking French 
(36) *Look there, (many) Canadians speak French 
Under Milsark's generalization, this restriction might be understood as a corollary : 
the referential reading is dependent on and derived from the existential reading. 
Milsark's generalization excluded existential readings from IL sentences, hence 
only SL sentences would be able to have referential readings. 
This account, however, cannot be kept intact in our new perspective: we allow 
non-generic/existential readings for IL sentences as well , and hence the 
existential/non-existential distinction cannot be employed to single out SL 
sentences. Referentiability does not cut across the SL/IL distinction, that is, the 
event/property distinction. Referentialibility seems to be a fundamental 
characteristic feature of event-hood. The referential-nonreferential distinction 
amounts , it appears, to restating the definition of the ILISL distinction; this is the 
significance of Thesis 4. 
Let us try to derive this generalization directly from the SLIIL distinction. 
Let us recall the form of the representation of an SL proposition given in ( 1 9), which 
I repeat here as (37): 
(37) Representation of an SL proposition p: 
NPI . . .  Pred . . .  e . . .  , 
where e is an event argument and NP is the subject of the predicate. 
If we take e as a variable, and unselectively bind (37) we get an existential construal : 
(38) Existential reading: 3(e, X) [NPI (X) . . .  Pred . . .  e . . .  ] 
If we take e as a constant and do not bind e, we assume that we get a referential 
construal: 
(39) Referential reading:  INPl / s ,w  = INPI I (l le l ,  where I I indicates the 
"universal " valuation and I I s ,w the interpretation relative to S and a 
model/world w with respect to which the situation in question is described. 
lei denotes the set of entities involved in e. 
The referential interpretation of NPI falls out from the referential construal of the 
event argument e. We assume that this is the only way indefinite NPs get referential 
readings . That is, indefinite REFERENTIAL NPs are dependent on events. 
So far, we have discussed Milsark's generalization within the bounds of the 
theory of propositions,  where its original form belongs .  Let us now move to the 
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discussion of the perceived connection between Milsark's generalization and the 
theory of judgments. In Japanese, the subject of a categorical judgment (i .e . ,  the wa­
phrase of a wa-marked sentence) must be a semantically definite noun phrase, 
assuming that generic bare NPs are semantically definite. We seem to be able to 
state a generalization much like Milsark's :  The subject of a categorical judgment 
must be strong. 
. 
But in our approach, this formulation is problematic ;  for, the strong/weak 
distinction as originally understood concerns a categorial distinction. But we do not 
distinguish generic (i .e. ,  strong) bare NPs from existential (i .e . ,  weak) bare NPs as a 
different category . We have only one kind of bare NPs ; i . e . ,  bare NPs are 
generic/existential NPs, though they may function pragmatically in distinct ways, as 
they could participate in the generic/universal type of inference or the non­
generic/existential type of inference, depending on pragmatic choices of domains. 
But according to Assertion 4 in section 3 .4 and the Analog of Assertion 4 in section 
4, a wa-marked bare NP, that is, a bare NP as the subject of a categorical judgment, 
must be interpreted in such a way that the wa-marked subject can be an input to a 
generic/universal inference. This condition must be characterized in terms of 
domains in our approach. To repeat, compare (40) and (4 1 ) :  
(40) ringo wa kago no naka ni kirei ni narabete atta [=(22)] 
' (the) apples are arranged beautifully in a basket' 
* 'there are apples arranged beautifully in a basket' 
(4 1 )  ringo ga kago no naka ni kirei ni narabete atta [=( 1 2)] 
'(the) apples are arranged beautifully in a basket' 
The plain sentence (4 1 )  could be interpreted in a g-domain; in fact, I have even 
suggested that that is the default choice. Be that as it may, (4 1 )  can be interpreted in 
a non-g-domain as well. In contrast, the wa-marking of the subject in (40) excludes 
this possibility ; the wa-marking signals that the interpretation is intended in a g­
domain. That means that the speaker must commit himself/herself to such a 
possibility of the subject term being an input to a generic/universal (A) type of 
inference. Likewise, compare (42) and (43) :  
(42) Canada-zin wa France-go 0 hanasu 
'(the) Canadians speak French' 
(43) Canada-zin ga France-go 0 hanasu 
'Canadians speak French' 
[=(28)] 
[=(25)d] 
The real world being what it is, the wa-marked sentence (42) can be accepted as a 
true statement only if the context is such that the generic statement " (the) Canadians 
present in the context speak French" is appropriate; that is, the context must be a g­
domain. (43), on the other hand, can be taken as a true statement about the real world 
itself, which is not a g-domain. In contrast, (44) is an adequate statement in any 
context as long as the discourse concerns the real world: 
(44) France-zin wa France-go 0 hanasu 
'The French speak French' 
We thus have a Milsark type of constraint, restricted to bare NPs, transferred to the 
theory of judgment and formulated in pragmatic terms: 
Thesis 5. (An analogue of Milsark's generalization) A categorical judgment 
must be interpreted in a g-domain of its subject. 
Mn..SARK'S GENERALIZATION AND CATEGORICAL JUDGMENTS 
This thesis is related to the definiteness effect on categorical judgments mentioned 
earlier: 
The definiteness effect on categorical judgments 
(a) The subject of a CATEGORICAL JUDGMENT must be a " semantically definite" 
(including "generic") noun phrase. 
(b) The subject of a CATEGORICAL JUDGMENT may not be (construed as) an indefinite 
"existential/cardinal" noun phrase. 
"Definite" and "indefinite"are mutually exclusive and hence (b) follows from (a) as 
a corollary. The definiteness effect applies to non-bare definite noun phrases such 
as sono ringo 'that apple(s)' and proper names, but Thesis 5 appears not to, since g­
domain has so far been defined only for bare noun phrases. But Thesis 5 can be 
understood to cover definite noun phrases as well by extending the concept of g­
domain to definite noun phrases : indeed in conformity with the definition of 
definiteness, any domain where a definite noun phrase can properly be used may be 
understood as a g-domain for it. Then, Thesis 5 can be taken as equivalent to the 
formulation of the definiteness effect given in (a) above. 
The advantage of Thesis 5 over the definiteness effect is that it does not refer 
to the definite/indefinite distinction, which is not syntactically marked in Japanese. 
We do not have to decide whether ringo 'apples' in (40), or, for that matter, France­
zin in (44), either, is definite or not. 
7. Summary and conclusion 
In the view expressed here, sentences with bare NP subjects (or, equivalently, the 
propositions represented by them) are of one kind, generic/existential, representing 
the same type of propositions, whether they are SL or IL (Thesis 1) ; the different 
construals of the subjects , either as generic or existential, are a matter of pragmatic 
choices of domains. More generally, logical representations of sentences are not 
semantic representations (Thesis 2) . 
The original form of Milsark's  generalization i s  about an epi­
phenomenon (Thesis 3) and needs no account (or, is  accounted for by the 
recognition that it represents an epiphenomenon) . However, we recognize a 
characteristic difference between SL and IL sentences with respect to the referential 
construal of indefinite NPs, the Residue of Milsark's generalization (Thesis 4) . 
The original epiphenomenon is couched in the distinction between SL/IL predicates, 
but when this epiphenomenon disappears as an epiphenomenon, what is left, the 
residue, is what couched it. 
Milsark's generalization originally belongs to the theory of propositions, but 
it seems to have commonly been perceived that it somehow relates to the theory of 
judgments ; it might even have been expected that the theory of judgments accounts 
for Milsark's generalization. But Milsark's generalization, on closer examination, 
turns out to be an epiphenomenon; thus, nothing is left in the theory of propositions 
for which the theory of judgments could render service to it by deriving it .  
Nonetheless, we recognize a phenomenon that belongs to the theory of judgments 
which could be thought of as responsible for the perceived relation of Milsark's 
generalization to the theory of judgments. In our approach, this phenomenon can be 
identified as a matter of pragmatic choices of the domains for the interpretation of 
categorical judgments,  An analogue of Milsark's generalization (Thesis 5). We 
have thus a generalization of a character quite different from Milsark's original, but I 
have retained Milsark's name for the sake of the perceived relation to its 
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namesake. 1 2 
Endnotes 
* I would like to thank Chris Barker, Gregory Carlson, John Moore and Susan 
Fischer, who read early drafts of this paper and gave me valuable comments and 
advice. 
1 .  At least for some predicates, the distinction between SLIIL must be understood 
relative to the sentences of which they are main predicates ;  in other words, the 
distinction is strictly speaking about sentences, and about predicates only relative to 
the sentences of which they are main predicates .  In what follows I apply SLIIL to 
sentences and predicates interchangeably. 
2 .  Cf: Kuroda ( 1 965 : 44) . Ladusaw ( 1 994) attempts to derive Milsark's  
generalization "from the assumptions involved in the ontology underlying the thetic 
categorical distinction. "  A step in his derivation corresponds to the definiteness 
effect cited here. Two formulations are given by Ladusaw: 
(i) The subject of a categorical judgment cannot be a nonspecific indefinite; its 
reference is "presupposed. " (First version) . 
(ii) The subject of the basis of a categorical judgment must be an object, not a 
description of an object. (Second Try) 
(ii) may be compared with the following statement, where substance corresponds to 
Ladusaw's concept of object: 
(iii) We might say that the 'topic' marker wa functions to indicate that the entity 
referred to is cognitively apprehended as substance. "  (Kuroda 1 992: 42) 
3. See Kuroda ( 1 965, Chapter 2; 1972; 1992, Chapter 1 ) .  The concepts CATEGORICAL 
JUDGMENT and THETIC JUDGMENT originate in the Brentano-Marty tradition of 
linguistic theory . They were applied to the account of the distinction between wa­
marked and plain sentences in Kuroda ( 1 972), but this account, in terms of 
judgments, originates in Kuroda ( 1 965 ; chapter 2), where the distinction is made 
between PREDICATIONAL JUDGMENT and NONPREDICA TIONAL DESCRIPTION . A more 
detailed account of judgment and sentence forms is given in Kuroda ( 1 992: chapter 
1 ) .  Kuroda (200 1 )  extends the concept of DESCRIPTION to IL sentences; the thetic 
judgment is a subtype of the description, with an SL predicate. 
4. The definition INPl ls ,w = INPl lnlel given in ( 1 9) is generally adequate only for 
the case where Pred is a one-place predicate, as Chris Barker pointed out to me. 
Take, for example, S= 'fruits are beautifully arranged beside rotten apples ' .  Then, 
rotten apples being fruits, INP l is, w as defined in ( 1 9) would contain rotten apples as 
well. In order to avoid this difficulty, let leis be the set of entities that participate in e 
with the theta role e of NP I in S ,  and let INPds,w = INP l lnle ls .  According to this 
revision, no domain is a g-domain for S = 'fruits are beautifully arranged beside 
rotten apples' ,  as desired. For our present purposes, we can restrict ourselves to one­
place predicates without losing generality. 
5 .  This default case assumption is independent of the maximality condition 
associated with the exhaustive listing implicature. Assume that some apples and 
oranges are arranged in a basket. Given this context, (20) does not satisfy the 
maximality condition in this sense, and yet satisfies the default case assumption, if 
there is no apple that is not in the basket. Conversely, if there are some apples that 
are not in the basket, (20) does not conform to the assumption, and yet it could 
satisfy the maximality condition if apples but nothing else are in the basket. 
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6. I argued that (i) cannot be assigned (ii) ,  and for that matter any logical 
representation, at the semantic level: 
(i)a 
b 
(ii) 
ringo ga kago no naka ni kireini narabete atta 
apple NOM basket GEN in at beautifully arrange was 
'apples were beautifully arranged in a basket' 
3X[APPLE(X)&ARRANGED-IN-A-BASKEf(X)] 
[=( 1 2)] 
[=( 1 3)] 
In contrast, one could argue that (iii) is effectively represented by (ii) at the semantic 
level, due to the special property of the predicate exist: 
(iii) a. kago no naka ni kireini narabete am ringo ga atta [= 15 ]  
basket GEN in at beautifully arrange be apple NOM was/existed 
b. 'apples that were beautifully arranged in a basket were/existed' 
For, the universally quantified proposition that a g-domain licenses for (iii) would 
be: 
(iv) VX[APPLE(X)&ARRANGED-IN-A-BASKEf(x)::JE(x)] 
where E(x) is the existence predicate. Formula (iv) is a tautology and needs no 
representation for the semantic/pragmatic function of a sentence; (ii) suffices for (iii) 
as a logical representation in any domain. 
Now, consider the English there insertion sentence (v) : 
(v) there are apples arranged beautifully in a basket 
On the one hand, (v) is commonly used as a translation of the Japanese sentence (i)a 
as well as the logical formula (ii) into English. On the other hand, we observed 
above a functional parallelism between the inference ( 17)b in English using (v) and 
the inference ( 1 6) in Japanese using (iii)a. It is reasonable to assume, then, that (v) is 
a surface transform of (iii)b, and not of (i)b . .  
Thus, for there insertion sentences it i s  legitimate to assume that existentially 
quantified formulas like (ii) are assigned at the semantic level, even though they are 
not for plain SL sentences like (i)b. 
7 .  Presupposing that it is a subdomain where S is interpretable, that is ,  that it 
contains the event e. 
8. Ringo wa in (23)a could refer to the apples that have already been mentioned in 
the course of the discourse, or the specific apples implicitly understood in the 
context, but it does not have to and in that case, the different effect of (23) 
attributable to wa seems to be that somehow or other the presence of apples are 
expected at parties or a particular party of the topic in the discourse.  According to 
native speaker consultants, under such circumstances, the use of the definite NP the 
apples is proper in English, even though it is not anaphoric. 
9 .  Cohen (2001 )  also notes "generics [that] receive what appears to be an existential 
interpretation . "  His existential generics, however, are accompanied by emphasis or 
focus. (26), given in the context in (25), may also be taken as implicitly focused, but 
(3 1 )-(32) are plain statements without focus and show that existential construals of 
IL sentences are not limited to those with emphasis or focus. 
10 .  I am not certain what presupposition, if any, is required for a subdomain where 
IL proposition p remains interpretable; see note 7 for the condition that subdomains 
contain the event e for the SL case. This Analogue must be understood as an axiom 
2 1 9  
220 S. -Y. Kuroda 
in confonnity with which the relevant sense of "subdomain" must be detennined. 
1 1 . Besides, as far as Japanese is concerned, complications involved in the syntax 
and semantics of numeral or cardinality expressions must be worked out before any 
substantive arguments can be made on them. For example, the following two forms 
of slightly different syntax seem to show varied acceptability. 
(Y ononaka mo kawatta mono da) 
('the world has changed) 
(i) Nihon-zin ga san-nin (mo) yuumeina major no sensyu da. 
Japanese NOM three-cLs (also) famous major GEN player be 
'(As many as) three Japanese are famous major league players' 
(ii) ?*San-nin (no) Nihonzin ga yuumeina major no sensyu da 
three-cLs GEN Japanese NOM FAMOUS major GEN player be 
'three Japanese are famous major league players' .  
1 2 . The original talk I gave at the SALT meeting was entitled "Categorical and thetic 
judgments, Milsark's generalization and the definiteness effect. " In a later part of 
the talk, I tried to elaborate on the contrast between the two types of "existential" 
sentences, illustrated by ( 1 2) and ( 1 5) ,  respectively, and the implication of that 
contrast for how thetic judgments are expressed. I called a sentence of the latter type 
the existential transform of the corresponding one of the former type. Syntactic 
ecology, so to speak, of a particular language could influence the profiles of these 
truth-conditionally equivalent but logically not equi-functional sentence types in that 
language. I claim that in English existential transforms are represented by there­
insertion sentences at the surface level. See note 6 above. Now, the thetic judgment 
is often (but should not be exclusively) associated with "existential" sentences, and 
for English, in particular, with there-insertion sentences, therefore with existential 
transforms,  in the sense introduced above. Due to this association, the thetic 
judgment appears also often associated with the " definiteness , " or rather, 
indefiniteness effect. In contrast, in Japanese, the existential transform should count 
rather as a marked form, and as a consequence, the plain form is a normal 
expression for a thetic judgment; Japanese thus is clear of the perceived 
(in)definiteness effect of thetic judgments. 
Paying attention to the functional contrast between sentences of the plain form 
and their existential transforms was instrumental for initiating the approach 
developed above. It would also be beneficial for a proper understanding of the thetic 
judgment beyond the bounds of truth conditional equivalence. But this topic is 
tangential to the main theme of this paper and I leave it for future work. 
References 
Carlson, Gregory N. 1 977. Reference to Kinds in English. U. MA Dissertation. 
[Published from New York: Garland Press, 1 980.] 
Cohen, Ariel. 200 1 .  Existential generics. Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, ms. 
Kuroda, S . -Y.  1965 . Generative Grammatical Studies in the Japanese Language, 
Dissertation, MIT. Facsimile edition, New York: Garland Press, 1979. 
Kuroda, S . -Y. 1 972. "The categorical and the thetic judgments ; evidence from 
Japanese syntax," Foundations of Language 9.2 : 1 53- 1 85 .  
Kuroda, S .-Y. 1992. Japanese Syntax and Semantics: Collected Papers. Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic. In particular, Chapter 1 .  Judgment forms and sentence 
forms . 
Kuroda, S . -Y.  200 1 .  Focusing on the matter of topic : a study of wa and ga in 
Japanese. Talk presented at Charles University, Prague. 
MILSARK'S GENERALIZATION AND CATEGORICAL JUDGMENTS 
Ladusaw, William A 1994. "Thetic and categorical, stage and individual, weak and 
strong. "  In M. Harvey and L. Santelmann eds . Proceedings of SALT IV, 
Ithaca, NY, 220-229. 
Milsark, G. L. 1977. Toward an explanation of certain peculiarities of the existential 
construction in English. Linguistic analysis 3 . 1 -30. 
22 1 
